In
Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish, the EAT has held that it is not possible for a man to bring a claim of "associative" pregnancy discrimination.
Before the Equality Act 2010 came into force on 1 October 2010, the law in Great Britain on associative discrimination was inconsistent across the different discrimination strands. Whilst under the Race Relations Act 1976 it was unlawful to treat an employee less favourably because of the race of a third party, associative discrimination was, generally speaking, not unlawful.
However, the domestic discrimination legislation had to be read in the light of European law. In
Coleman v Attridge Law, Mrs Coleman was forced to quit her job after she requested time off to look after her four-year-old disabled son. Following decisions of the ECJ and the EAT, it was held that direct disability discrimination could arise where a person is treated less favourably because of the disability of a third party (e.g, Mrs Coleman’s son).
In
Kulikaoskas, the Claimant and his partner were both dismissed from their employment after less than three weeks in the job. Mr Kulikaoskas alleged that he had been dismissed because of his partner’s pregnancy. He bought a claim under s3A of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, which provided that a person discriminates against a woman if, during pregnancy and maternity leave, he treats her less favourably on the ground of her pregnancy.
The tribunal refused to accept Mr Kulikaoskas’s discrimination claim. He appealed on the grounds that s3A of the SDA 1975 had to be interpreted in the same way as the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 had been in the Coleman case – in other words, he should be protected against associative pregnancy discrimination.
The EAT dismissed his appeal. Its primary reason for doing so was that European law did not require section 3A of the SDA 1975 to be read as covering associative pregnancy discrimination. It distinguished the Coleman case because it had been decided under the Framework Directive. On the other hand, Mr Kulikaoskas’s claim fell under the remit of the Pregnant Workers’ Directive and the Equal Treatment Directive, which recognised that special protection is required in respect of the biological condition of pregnancy. If the intention of these Directives was to define discrimination as less favourable treatment of a person “in relation to a woman’s pregnancy” they could have done so.
Because it considered the law to be clear, the EAT declined to make a reference to the ECJ. Although it was not required to consider the position under the Equality Act 2010, it did comment that, given the same facts, it was not entirely clear if Mr Kulikaoskas’ claim would have succeeded under the new regime. Time, and case law, will tell…